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1169 
THE JOHN F. SONNETT  
MEMORIAL LECTURE 
A PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY:  
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE AND WORK OF 




“The true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good 
government.”1 
In his memorable judgment in the matter in which the Constitutional 
Court declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional, S v. Makwanyane,2 
former Chief Justice Ismail Mahomed spoke of the new South African 
Constitution in the following terms: 
 All Constitutions seek to articulate, with differing degrees of intensity 
and detail, the shared aspirations of a nation; the values which bind its 
people, and which discipline its government and its national institutions; 
the basic premises upon which judicial, legislative and executive power is 
to be wielded; the constitutional limits and the conditions upon which that 
power is to be exercised . . . and the moral and ethical direction which that 
nation has identified for its future.  In some countries the Constitution 
only formalises, in a legal instrument, a historical consensus of values and 
aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken past to 
accommodate the needs of the future.  The South African Constitution is 
different:  it retains from the past only what is defensible and represents a 
decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past . . . .  
The contrast between the past which it repudiates and the future to which 
it seeks to commit the nation is stark and dramatic . . . .  What the 
Constitution expressly aspires to do is to provide a transition from the[] 
grossly unacceptable features of the past to a conspicuously contrasting 
future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and 
 
*  Judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (1994–2009).  This Essay is based on 
remarks delivered on February 13, 2012, at the John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture held at 
Fordham University School of Law. 
 1. This quote is inscribed on the facade of the New York Supreme Court courthouse at 
60 Centre Street. 
 2. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.3 
The powerful message of this passage is that the South African 
Constitution is a transformative document which recognises that our society 
needs to change in fundamental ways and which articulates the values that 
are to guide the process of transformation.  It is nearly eighteen years since 
constitutional democracy dawned in South Africa.  Eighteen years in which 
constitutional democracy has been taking root and in which a strong form 
of judicial review has been undertaken by the courts.  My purpose this 
evening is to describe to you the role of the courts, and particularly the 
Constitutional Court, in this new constitutional order. 
To me, the real strength of understanding other societies and their 
constitutions (and indeed the South African Constitution permits courts 
when interpreting its Bill of Rights to look at foreign law),4 is that it often 
liberates one from the habits and assumptions of one’s own training and 
experience.  It can facilitate the identification of strengths and weaknesses 
in one’s own system and enable one to see more clearly the structural 
constraints that historical antecedents and present conditions impose.  In so 
doing, it allows us to imagine different ways of being both democratic and 
respectful of human rights—the twin obligations of the modern state. 
Before turning to the role of the Court, I am going briefly to describe 
how our Constitution was drafted.  Then, I will discuss the genesis of the 
Court and how its members are appointed.  And finally, I will describe the 
role of the Court under the Constitution by illustrating two aspects of our 
jurisprudence:  how the Court deals with difference in our society; and how 
it adjudicates social and economic rights—two of the most challenging 
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, in our democracy, as well as in many 
others. 
I.  THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
How was the South African Constitution drafted?5  The process which 
culminated in our Constitution commenced in the 1990s with the release 
from prison of the leaders of the liberation movements, the African 
National Congress, and the Pan-Africanist Congress.  Four years of intense 
negotiations followed, which resulted initially in deadlock.  The liberation 
movements wanted a constitution drafted by a democratically elected 
constituent assembly.  The National Party government wanted a 
constitution drafted by negotiation prior to the first elections.  Finally, it 
was agreed that a two-stage process to constitutional and political reform 
would be followed.  A temporary or interim constitution was negotiated and 
 
 3. Id. at 487–88 para. 262 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39(1)(c). 
 5. Some of this section of the speech draws on a speech I delivered at Trinity College 
Dublin in April 2000 and since published as Cultivating a Constitution:  Challenges Facing 
the Constitutional Court in South Africa, 22 DUBLIN U. L.J. 1, 3–7 (2000). 
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enacted by the minority government.  In terms of the interim constitution, 
elections would be held to elect a new Parliament. 
The newly elected Parliament would have two roles:  the first was as 
national legislature; and the second was as a Constitutional Assembly 
responsible for drafting a new constitution.  The fears of the National Party 
were met, however, by an agreement that the new constitution would 
comply with certain constitutional principles agreed before 1994 and 
annexed as a schedule to the interim constitution.  It was agreed that a new 
Constitutional Court would be established which would have the duty of 
determining whether the new constitution adopted by the Constitutional 
Assembly complied with the thirty-four constitutional principles set out in 
the interim Constitution.  This compromise was the genesis of the 
Constitutional Court:  it was to be established to decide if the new 
constitution was indeed constitutional! 
The constitution-making process involved a high degree of public 
participation.  Right from the start, key figures in the process identified the 
need to involve members of the public.  Cyril Ramaphosa, speaking on 24 
January, shortly after the Assembly was convened, stated: 
It is therefore important that as we put our vision to the country, we 
should do so directly, knowing that people out there want to be part 
of the process and will be responding, because in the end the 
drafting of the constitution must not be the preserve of the 490 
members of this Assembly.  It must be a constitution which they 
feel they own, a constitution that they know and feel belongs to 
them.  We must therefore draft a constitution that will be fully 
legitimate, a constitution that will represent the aspirations of our 
people.6 
Ramaphosa was right.  If, as Ismail Mahomed says, a constitution is not 
merely a legal document but is a charter which identifies the shared 
aspirations of a nation and its common values,7 a process of public 
participation is essential. 
Consulting the public in any society is never an easy task.  In South 
Africa, a society (at the time) of more than 40 million people, many of 
whom live in poverty in rural areas, many of whom are not fully literate, 
and many of whom have only irregular access to print or electronic media, 
it is daunting indeed.8  The approach adopted by the Constitutional 
Assembly was multifaceted.  Advertisements were placed in the print and 
broadcast media calling for submissions to the Constitutional Assembly.  In 
excess of 1.7 million submissions were received, the bulk of which were 
petitions on discrete issues.  In addition, a series of public meetings were 
held throughout the Republic:  attended by more than 20,000 people and 
 
 6. HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION:  CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 239 (1998). 
 7. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA at 487–88 para. 262. 
 8. See EBRAHIM, supra note 6, at 241. 
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717 organisations.9  Of these meetings, Hassen Ebrahim, the executive 
Director of the Constitutional Assembly said: 
The public meetings held were extremely successful:  discussions were 
lively, ideas original, and the exchange of views appreciated.  These 
meetings also served to highlight the point that constitutions are about 
basic values affecting society and should be understood by even the least 
educated.  It was a humbling experience to realize that constitutional 
debates and issues are not only the domain of the intellectual elite, but 
that they belong to everyone.10 
In addition, there were television and radio programmes broadcast to air 
the key issues under negotiation.  By and large, these programmes were 
structured as discussions between members of the Constitutional Assembly 
and members of civil society on issues under consideration in the Assembly 
such as the Bill of Rights, the separation of powers, the national anthem and 
flag, traditional leaders, and the death penalty. 
A website was also created which contained a database of all the 
information produced by the Constitutional Assembly, including minutes, 
drafts, opinions, and submissions.  It was early days for the internet, 
especially in South Africa, but the site was very popular.  The material on 
the site is currently being recaptured and indexed and it is hoped that it will 
soon be available on the Constitutional Court website, 
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za. 
How successful was the process of public participation?  That is difficult 
to evaluate.  Its purpose was clearly twofold:  a substantive one to allow 
members of the public to affect the actual provisions of the Constitution 
itself; and a process-based one, rooted in a conception of democracy which 
is participative rather than merely representative.  No work has been done, 
as far as I am aware, on the extent to which the process of public 
participation affected the actual text of the Constitution and I cannot 
helpfully speculate on it.  Perhaps there is an interesting doctoral thesis to 
be written there. 
And what of the process purpose of public participation?  Independent 
market research at the time revealed that the campaign for public 
participation reached as many as 65 percent of South Africans.11  The same 
research makes it clear that many members of the public were sceptical 
about the call for public participation.12  Yet the sheer number of 
submissions received and the extent of participation in public meetings 
suggested that there was great interest and significant involvement in the 
process. 
It is perhaps worth noting here that negotiated change has had to take 
place in many walks of South African life.  Local government, for example, 
 
 9. Id. at 244. 
 10. Id. at 245. 
 11. Id. at 243. 
 12. See id. at 239–50. 
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had been racially divided under apartheid, with each town having separate 
municipal councils based on race.  In each municipal area, negotiations had 
to take place to arrange for the manner in which the separate councils would 
merge.  Similarly, many public organisations, from school boards to 
sporting codes have had to renegotiate their ground rules of their 
organisations.  These processes were often conflictual at first, but by and 
large, through compromise and negotiation, solutions to apparently 
intractable problems were reached. 
Not surprisingly, then, inclusive processes that emphasise participation 
have become important values of our new constitutional democracy.  They 
are widely accepted ground rules in many walks of South African life.  And 
I think there can be no doubt that the public participation process around the 
Constitution contributed to this. 
The importance of participation in law-making processes is also given 
expression in a wide variety of constitutional provisions.  For example, the 
new Constitution requires both houses of Parliament to “facilitate public 
involvement” in their legislative and other processes.13  The Constitutional 
Court has had to interpret these provisions on several occasions.  Relying 
extensively on international law, the Court has held, by majority, that the 
provisions require Parliament to act reasonably to facilitate public 
involvement in law-making.  If Parliament unreasonably fails to facilitate 
public involvement, the consequence may be that the legislation enacted 
will be invalid, though any order of invalidity will ordinarily be suspended 
to enable Parliament to adopt a reasonable process to facilitate public 
involvement.  The Court was clear that Parliament’s view of what would 
constitute reasonable facilitation of public involvement would be respected 
by the courts.14  As former Chief Justice Ngcobo said in his judgment: 
[T]he duty to facilitate public involvement must be construed in the 
context of our constitutional democracy, which embraces the principle of 
participation and consultation.  Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
have broad discretion to determine how best to fulfil their constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public involvement in a given case, so long as they 
act reasonably.  Undoubtedly, this obligation may be fulfilled in different 
ways and is open to innovation on the part of the legislatures.  In the end, 
however, the duty to facilitate public involvement will often require 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures to provide citizens with a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard in the making of the laws that will 
govern them.  Our Constitution demands no less.15 
 
 13. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 59(1)(a), 72(1)(a). 
 14. See Doctors for Life Int’l v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at 
467 para. 124; see also Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. (2) 
2007 (6) SA 477 (CC) at 491–94 paras. 50–55. 
 15. Doctors for Life 2006 (6) SA at 474 para. 145. 
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II.  THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:  FOSTERING A 
DEMOCRACY BASED ON PUBLIC REASON 
The Constitutional Court is the final court of appeal in constitutional 
matters.  Although somewhat resistant to precise definition, a constitutional 
matter is a matter that involves the interpretation or enforcement of a 
provision of the Constitution.  Given the scope of the Bill of Rights in our 
Constitution, the range of constitutional matters is far broader than it would 
be were the Bill of Rights to be less expansive. 
Right at the beginning, the Constitution declares that the “Constitution is 
the supreme law of the Republic” and “law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”16  The 
corollary of this is that a court, “when deciding a constitutional matter 
within its power” must declare law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution to be invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.17  The 
Constitution then provides that the Court may make any “just and 
equitable” order.18   Such an order may suspend the order of invalidity for 
any period and on any conditions in order to allow the competent authority, 
which may be Parliament, a provincial legislature, or an administrator, the 
opportunity to correct the defect. The court may also limit the retrospective 
effect of the order of invalidity. 
The special role of the Constitutional Court is recognised by a rule that 
an order of constitutional invalidity in respect of an Act of Parliament, 
provincial legislation, or conduct of the President will have no force unless 
it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.19  Between five and ten cases 
are confirmed by the Court each year through this procedure. 
A.  The Appointment of Judges 
The eleven judges of the Constitutional Court thus play an important and 
powerful role under our constitutional order. Not surprisingly, then, the 
procedure for appointment of judges under our Constitution also marks a 
distinct change from the past when judges were appointed by the member 
of Cabinet responsible for the administration of justice (the Minister of 
Justice).  In 1994, for the first time, a Judicial Service Commission was 
established to participate in the process of the selection of judges.20  Its first 
task was to assist in the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court. 
Under the terms of the 1996 Constitution, the Commission has twenty-
three members21:  the Chief Justice, who presides; the President of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal; the Minister of Justice; one Judge President (that 
is a judge who presides over one of the High Courts); four practising 
 
 16. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 2. 
 17. Id. § 172(1)(a). 
 18. Id. § 172(1)(b). 
 19. Id. § 172(2)(a). 
 20. Id. § 178(1); see Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 (S. Afr.). 
 21. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 178. 
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lawyers; a professor of law; four presidential nominees; and ten members of 
Parliament (comprising four representatives from the National Council of 
Provinces (the upper house) and six representatives from the National 
Assembly—of these six, at least three must be members of the Opposition 
in Parliament).22 
High Court judges and judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal (formerly 
the Appellate Division and the highest court of appeal in nonconstitutional 
matters) are appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission.23  In practice, this has meant when vacancies arise, the 
Commission calls for nominations and then compiles a short list of 
candidates for interview.  Interviews are held in public, though they are not 
televised.  In the case of Constitutional Court judges, the transcripts of the 
interviews of the successful candidates for the Constitutional Court are 
available on the Court’s website.  The Commission then sends to the 
President the names it recommends for appointment.  As far as I am aware, 
the President has never rejected a name proposed by the Commission. 
The Constitution itself expressly requires that a key factor for the 
Commission to consider in appointing judges is “[t]he need for the judiciary 
to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa.”24  In 
1994, of 166 judges all but four were white men.  Today the figure has 
changed significantly.  The composition of the Constitutional Court bench 
in July 2011 was as follows:  eight men (three White and five Black) and 
two Black women.  The current Chief Justice is Mogoeng Mogoeng; and 
the Deputy Chief Justice is Dikgang Moseneke.  Constitutional Court 
judges serve a maximum period of fifteen years.25 
Why should we be concerned about the demographics of the bench?  
There is an extensive literature on why it is appropriate for a judiciary to be 
diverse,26 but for me two reasons stand out.  The first is that a diverse bench 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. § 174(6). 
 24. Id. § 174(2). 
 25. See S. AFR. CONST., First Amendment Act of 2001. 
 26. See, e.g., Sean Cooney, Gender and Judicial Selection:  Should There Be More 
Women on the Courts?, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 20 (1993); Rachel Davis & George Williams, 
Reform of the Judicial Appointments Process:  Gender and the Bench of the High Court of 
Australia, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 819 (2003); Richard F. Devlin, We Can’t Go on Together 
with Suspicious Minds:  Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective in R. v. R.D.S., 18 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 408 (1995); Murray Gleeson, Judicial Selection and Training:  Two Sides of 
the One Coin, 77 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 591 (2003); Regina Graycar, The Gender of Judgments:  
Some Reflections on “Bias,” 32 U. B.C. L. REV. 1 (1998); Brenda Hale, Equality and the 
Judiciary:  Why Should We Want More Women Judges?, 2001 PUB. L. 489; Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Making a Difference:  The Pursuit of a Compassionate Justice, 31 U. B.C. 
L. REV. 1 (1997); Errol P. Mendes, “Promoting Heterogeneity of the Judicial Mind”:  
Minority and Gender Representation in the Canadian Judiciary, in ONT. LAW REFORM 
COMM’N, APPOINTING JUDGES:  PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND PRACTICE 91 (1991); Martha 
Minow, Equalities, 88 J. PHIL. 663 (1991); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or 
Enriched by Experience:  Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1201 (1992); Jennifer Nedelsky, Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law, 42 
MCGILL L.J. 91 (1997); Maryka Omatsu, The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality, 9 CAN. J. 
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enhances the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes of the broader 
community.  It is important in a diverse society that the bench is not seen to 
be the preserve of a particular group or elite, or this will damage the 
institution.  Within this reason, however, lurks a danger that can be 
described as the siren of identity determinism.  Your identity determines 
your judgments.  If you are a black male judge, you will sympathise with a 
black male accused/complainant and your judgment will reflect this.  The 
notion extends further:  if you are a black male judge, you have an 
obligation to see the world in a particular way; and if you do not, you are to 
be criticised for that.  Such reasoning must be rejected vigorously. 
This is not to say that, as human beings, judges are not products of the 
societies within which they live; and that their race, gender, religion, 
schooling, and a variety of other factors have affected their beliefs and 
understanding of the world.  But the task of judging in a democracy 
demands more of judges than that they merely give effect to a world-view 
inherited from their particular background.  It demands a self-conscious 
appreciation of the impact of their background on their way of thinking and 
a conscientious attempt at all times to be impartial.  In my view, the 
obligation of impartiality leads directly to the second important reason that 
our Constitution requires diversity on the bench. 
In his direct and honest statement to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, my former colleague Justice Ackermann remarked: 
Judges who believe that they are wholly free of prejudice delude 
themselves.  It behoves us all to seek out rigorously, painful as that might 
be, our own particular prejudices, of whatever nature.  We need to keep 
these constantly in mind and to endeavour actively and persistently to 
counteract them.  Furthermore, we all need to understand the insidious 
influence of institutional culture and to appreciate the powerful effects of 
the class, social and political environments in which we live and work, 
and the potential that this has for making us insensitive to the context and 
views of others.27 
So requiring diversity on a collegial court enables judges to interrogate 
their own prejudices or blind-spots.  The more alike judges are, the more 
likely that they will mistake prejudices for simple truths; the more different 
they are, the more likely that they will interrogate the correctness of their 
assumptions.  If our backgrounds are the same, it is very comfortable and 
easy to reinforce the prejudices that such backgrounds foster.  When we are 
different, prejudices masquerading as “common sense” or “the ways things 
are” are much more likely to be uncovered.  If judges are, as the South 
African oath of office requires, to “administer justice to all persons alike 
 
WOMEN & L. 1 (1997); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life 
Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173 (1992); Bertha Wilson, Will Women 
Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507 (1990). 
 27. L. W. H. Ackermann, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Re:  
The Role of the Judiciary, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 15, 54 (1998). 
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without fear, favour or prejudice,”28 we need to know where our prejudices 
lie.  To me, therefore, this is the second reason for diversity on the bench:  
the fostering of judicial self-awareness is of great importance to me as a 
judge.  It is a constant reminder not to delude myself that I am by nature 
impartial.  Needless to say, it is a consideration which I like to draw to the 
attention of my colleagues from time to time as well! 
B.  The Work of the Court 
The Constitutional Court has handed down 422 judgments in its first 
seventeen years of existence, a rate of just under twenty-five per year.  This 
is not a prodigious judicial output compared to other senior courts around 
the world.  But that relatively low output needs to be assessed in the light of 
three considerations. 
The first is that the Court has eleven members, and the general rule is that 
all eleven judges sit in every case.  Although there is no doubt that the size 
of the Court is valuable in many respects, it probably slows down the 
process of decision-making and writing.  Just, for example, to go round the 
table and permit every judge to air his or her views on a case will often take 
an hour. 
Secondly, the Court receives far more applications for access to the Court 
than it actually enrols for hearing.  Each of these applications, which in the 
last four years that I was at the Court exceeded the number of cases heard 
on a ratio of between three and four to one (that is, an additional seventy-
five to one hundred cases per annum to those that are actually enrolled for 
hearing) are considered by all the judges of the Court, unlike other senior 
appellate courts which often delegate this decision making responsibility to 
a few judges.  As our Constitution stipulates that a quorum of the Court is 
eight, no one can be turned away from the Court without at least eight 
judges having considered the matter.29 
Finally, the issues that have come before the court in its first seventeen 
years have been some of the most difficult considered by courts anywhere.  
Some have attracted much public comment, such as the constitutionality of 
the death penalty, gay marriage, and some high profile criminal matters.  
Other issues have required the Court to grapple with issues relating to the 
interpretation and protection of social and economic rights—where there is 
no tried and tested path—and questions of constitutional structure and 
relationship that involve interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution 
other than the Bill of Rights. 
How often does the Court declare an Act of Parliament to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution? According to my records, the Court has heard 147 
such challenges and in ninety cases has upheld the challenge, an average of 
just under six times a year.  Interestingly, the average has not declined 
markedly over the period.  In the first five years, twenty-nine legislative 
 
 28. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 sched. 2, item 6. 
 29. Id. § 167(2). 
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provisions were declared to be invalid.  In the following five years, twenty-
nine legislative provisions were declared invalid, and in the seven years 
since, thirty-two provisions have been declared to be invalid. 
It is important to realise that, in many cases, the declaration of invalidity 
is not controversial.  Indeed the rules of the Court provide that the relevant 
government minister responsible for the legislation must be given notice of 
the challenge and afforded an opportunity to oppose it.  It is not infrequent 
that the Minister appears only to indicate that the government does not 
vigorously wish to argue that the legislation is constitutional, but only 
wishes to make submissions as to the appropriate order to be made by the 
Court to regulate the effect of the declaration of invalidity. 
Sometimes, of course, the declaration of invalidity is controversial 
particularly with the public.  The leading example of this is the death 
penalty case that I mentioned at the outset in which the legislative provision 
which provided for capital punishment was declared to be inconsistent with 
the Constitution and invalid.  The Court directed all persons sentenced to 
death would remain in custody until their sentences were substituted by 
lawful punishments.30  Similarly controversial was the order in the case of 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie31 which declared section 30(1) of the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 to be inconsistent with the Constitution and 
invalid because it “does not permit same-sex couples to enjoy the status and 
the benefits coupled with responsibilities it accords to heterosexual 
couples.”32 
The model of judicial review adopted in the South African Constitution 
gives considerable powers to courts to determine the constitutionality of 
legislation, and once having done so, compels a court to declare legislation 
inconsistent with the Constitution invalid.  Yet there are other provisions in 
the Constitution which make it plain that the Court must listen carefully to 
the reasons given by the legislature and executive for enacting legislation 
which limits rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
The model of rights adjudication is a two-stage model, perhaps most 
closely aligned with (though by no means identical to) the Canadian 
model.33  This means that a court when considering a constitutional 
challenge to legislation asks two questions.  The first is, does the legislation 
limit a right entrenched in the Bill of Rights—this exercise is by no means 
formal or automatic.  The Court has adopted a careful approach to 
delineating the scope of rights, and a litigant bears the burden of 
establishing that his or her right is infringed by the legislation under attack.  
 
 30. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 453 para. 151. 
 31. 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). 
 32. Id. at 585. 
 33. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that the “rights 
and freedoms set out . . . [in this Charter are] subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, pt. 1, § 1 (U.K.). 
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Should the Court decide that the legislation does limit a right, the next 
question that will arise is whether the limitation is “reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”34  This affords the executive defending the 
constitutionality of legislation an opportunity both to lead evidence and 
present argument as to why the legislation is not unconstitutional. 
How does the Court decide whether an infringement will nevertheless 
pass the test of justification?  It considers whether the reason given by the 
government for limiting the right is sufficiently important to outweigh the 
impact it causes in limiting the right.  This is essentially a proportionality 
analysis.  The approach was summarised in an early decision of the Court 
as follows: 
In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effect and importance of 
the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and 
effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other.  The 
more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive 
the grounds of justification must be.35 
The process of limitations analysis therefore permits the Court to 
consider the reasons proffered by government for the legislation under 
attack.  In so doing, it affords a government an opportunity to set out its 
reasons for the limitation to persuade the Court, and the broader society, of 
the legitimacy of both its purpose and method. 
As we saw in relation to the legislature’s obligation to public 
participation in the making of legislation, where the Court held that the 
legislature must openly and reasonably determine the extent of public 
participation it will facilitate in the making of any particular law, limitation 
analysis requires the government to disclose its reasons for enacting 
legislation which has infringed the Bill of Rights.  The Court then assesses 
whether those reasons are sufficient given the nature of the limitation of 
rights concerned.  In a real sense, the function of the Court here is twofold:  
most obviously, it serves as the guardian of fundamental rights; less 
obviously, but as importantly, it serves to create a forum for public debate 
about the reasons for the exercise of power.  This role carries with it a 
conception of democracy which requires the exercise of public power to be 
accountable.  Again and again, our Constitution confers power upon courts 
to enable citizens to hold public power accountable through requiring the 
disclosure of reasons for the exercise of power in a public and open forum. 
III.  “SOUTH AFRICA BELONGS TO ALL WHO LIVE IN IT, 
UNITED IN OUR DIVERSITY” 
So proclaims the Preamble to our Constitution.  What is the role of the 
courts and the Bill of Rights in realising this goal?  The challenge posed by 
the principle arises in a variety of different arenas:  traditional leaders and 
 
 34. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1). 
 35. S v. Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at 395 para. 18. 
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customary law, religious and cultural practices, and the rights of 
noncitizens.  The Court has had cases in all these areas.  Tonight I only 
have time to discuss two.  The first concerns customary law; and the second 
cultural and religious practices in schools. 
As a matter of social practice, traditional leaders still play an important 
part in South African public life, particularly in the rural areas, and so does 
customary law.  Our democratic Constitution recognises traditional 
leadership and confirms that “[t]he institution, status and role of traditional 
leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the 
Constitution.”36  It also provides that “[t]he courts must apply customary 
law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution.”37 
The first important case where the Court has had to consider customary 
law was the case of Mrs. Bhe.38  She came to court seeking relief on behalf 
of her seven- and ten-year old daughters.  The father of the children, Mr. 
Maboyisi Mgolombane died intestate in October 2002.  He had been a 
carpenter and she a domestic worker and they lived together in an informal 
home in the giant township of Khayelitsha just outside Cape Town.  Upon 
Mr. Mgolombane’s death, his father was declared sole heir in the deceased 
estate according to the customary principle of male primogeniture, Mr. 
Mgolombane having no surviving male children.  The father intended to 
sell the family home in order to cover funeral expenses which would have 
left Mrs. Bhe and the two young girls homeless.  With the assistance of a 
local organisation, Mrs. Bhe launched a constitutional challenge to the 
customary law rule of male primogeniture which reached the Constitutional 
Court in 2004. 
Speaking on behalf of the majority, Chief Justice Langa held that: 
The exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender 
is a clear violation of . . . the Constitution.  It is a form of 
discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage among 
a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and 
male domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality under 
this constitutional order.39 
The Court thus declared that the rule of male primogeniture in customary 
law was inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that it excludes 
women or extramarital children from inheriting property. 
The message of the Bhe case, based on the express text of the 
Constitution, is that customary law is to be recognised as an important 
system of law in our society.  Yet, like all laws in our legal system, it is 
subject to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and, in this case, was held 
to be inconsistent with the right to be free from unfair discrimination.  This 
is the first important principle of the Constitution’s protection of diversity 
 
 36. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 211(1). 
 37. Id. § 211(3). 
 38. Bhe v. Magistrate 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). 
 39. Id. at 621–22 para. 91. 
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in our society:  it embraces the pluralist character of our society but on 
express terms.  The fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution may 
not be impaired by any community or culture. 
The second case that is illustrative of the approach to diversity in our 
constitutional framework is the case of Sunali Pillay.40  Ms. Pillay was a 
fifteen-year-old student at a public school for girls in Durban.  The school 
had a code of conduct which provided for a school uniform and which 
prohibited the wearing of jewelry at school, save for ear-studs (at the same 
level), watches, and medic-alert bracelets. 
Ms. Pillay’s family came originally from southern India and some of the 
women in her family had a tradition of wearing a nose stud, which is a 
widespread cultural and religious practice in Hindu communities in 
southern India.  Contrary to the school rules, Ms. Pillay had her nose 
pierced and started wearing a tiny nose stud to school.  The school objected 
but gave her three months’ grace to allow the piercing to settle and then told 
her that she would have to remove the stud.  When Ms. Pillay did not do so, 
the school asked her and her mother to explain on what basis they sought an 
exemption from the school’s uniform code.  Her mother explained that: 
It is a time-honoured family tradition.  Sunali and I come from a South 
Indian family that has sought to maintain a cultural identity by respecting 
and implementing the traditions of the women before us.  Usually, a 
young woman would get her nose pierced upon her physical maturity (the 
onset of her menstrual cycle) as an indication that she is now eligible for 
marriage.  While this physically oriented reasoning no longer applies, we 
do still use the tradition to honour our daughters as responsible young 
adults.41 
After consulting experts on Hindu religion and culture, the school 
decided that this reasoning did not warrant an exemption to be made and 
proceeded with school disciplinary hearings against Ms. Pillay, who then 
approached the Equality Court.  The matter wound its way through the 
court system to the Constitutional Court, which by a majority upheld Ms. 
Pillay’s claim.  In the end result, although the Court was divided on the 
precise order, the principle that underlay both judgments was the principle 
that, under our Constitution, diversity must not only be tolerated but 
fostered. 
IV.  A SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIALITY:  SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Time does not permit a full consideration of this aspect of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, but I shall describe it briefly. 
Rights that are protected are the right of access to adequate housing,42 to 
a basic education,43 the right of access to health care services, sufficient 
 
 40. MEC for Educ. v. Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC), CCT 51/06 (Oct. 5, 2007).  This is 
an as yet unreported judgment of the Constitutional Court. 
 41. Id. at 67 para. 131. 
 42. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26. 
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food and water, and social security.44  Apart from education, the format of 
the rights is similar, so in the case of housing the right provides:  
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  (2) The 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.”45 
In including such rights within the Bill of Rights, South Africa went 
beyond the conventional terrain of a Bill of Rights in commonwealth 
countries.  Most domestic rights instruments protect civil and political 
rights, such as the right to freedom of expression and association.  Far fewer 
protect social and economic rights directly.  However, a distinction between 
civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social and economic rights, 
on the other, was not followed when the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
1948. 
Indeed, in a recent fascinating book,46 Cass Sunstein has suggested that a 
key reason for the inclusion of both civil and political rights, as well as 
social and economic rights, was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s insistence that the 
two were interrelated.  FDR famously identified four essential human 
freedoms:  freedom of speech, freedom to worship God in one’s own way, 
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.47  This led him to draft what he 
called “the second Bill of Rights,” which contained social and economic 
rights.48 
As a matter of normative desirability too, there is no difference between 
social and economic rights and civil and political rights.  The desirability of 
ensuring that all citizens receive basic education, are properly housed, have 
access to food, clean water, and healthcare is not, I think, a controversial 
one.  Indeed, social and economic rights are in some sense anterior to civil 
and political rights.  The basic needs of human beings for shelter, nutrition, 
and clothing must be met before a lively interest in freedom of expression 
and association arises.  It is for this reason that many international 
documents acknowledge the indivisibility and interdependence of social 
and economic rights, on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the 
other. 
In the South African context, however, the inclusion and protection of 
social and economic rights in the Constitution had great significance.  The 
real effect of centuries of colonialism, followed by decades of apartheid has 
been the impoverishment of black South Africans and the correlative 
enrichment of white South Africans.  Our society is one of the most unequal 
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 44. Id. § 27. 
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in the world, and one in which the colour of one’s skin remains a strong 
predictor of socioeconomic status.  Unless the basic needs of food, housing, 
and education are met, civil and political rights may seem mere luxuries.   
This might have carried the message that the Constitution contained a 
charter for whites and the wealthy while remaining oblivious to the needs of 
black South Africans who had been historically dispossessed and excluded. 
The real challenge in entrenching social and economic rights is to 
determine the scope of their justiciability.  There is a widespread view 
amongst politicians and lawyers that civil and political rights, on the one 
hand, and social and economic rights, on the other, are in some significant 
way conceptually different.  Social and economic rights have been labelled 
“second generation” rights, while civil and political rights are considered 
“first generation.”  (I might point out that this categorisation seems to me to 
be back-to-front—if food, water, and housing are indeed anterior as a 
matter of lived experience to civil and political rights, should they not be 
the first?) 
The challenge is a complex one.  Both civil and political rights, and 
social and economic rights may impose an obligation upon the government 
that is essentially negative in character.  Do not limit my right to free 
speech.  Do not evict me from my home.  Enforcement of the negative 
obligations that rights impose is rarely controversial or difficult, whether 
the right concerned is the right of freedom of expression or the right of 
access to housing. 
The justiciability of both, however, becomes more difficult when one has 
to consider whether the right not only imposes a negative obligation, but 
also a positive one.  Does the state have a duty to make it possible for 
people to exercise their right of freedom of expression?  Does the state have 
a duty to provide everyone with a house?  Our intuitive anxiety about the 
justiciability of social and economic rights largely arises from our 
assumption that they primarily impose positive obligations upon 
government.  And it is not different from the difficult questions that arise in 
the context of positive obligations that arise in respect of civil and political 
rights, whether it is the right to vote or the right to reasonable 
accommodation in disability law. 
The South African Constitution helps to answer this question in relation 
to most of the social and economic rights by delineating quite carefully the 
extent of the positive obligation upon the state.  So section 26(2) of the 
Constitution states:  “The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right.”49  I probably don’t need to highlight the word 
“reasonable” in the section to you.  It is indeed the key to the Court’s 
approach to the justiciability of social and economic rights. 
 
 49. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26(2). 
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In the Nevirapine case,50 in which the government proposed to establish 
only two sites per province for Nevirapine to be provided to HIV positive 
pregnant mothers, the question was whether that constituted a reasonable 
measure to achieve the right of access to health care.51  Given that the 
manufacturers of the medication were furnishing it to the government for 
free, and given that it was clear that the government had the capacity to 
establish testing and counselling centres in excess of two per province, and 
given the World Health Organization’s assessment of the value of 
Nevirapine in reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the Court held 
that the government’s plan was not reasonable.52  The order the Court made 
was: 
 It is declared that:   
(a)  Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the government 
to devise and implement within its available resources a 
comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise progressively 
the rights of pregnant women and their newborn children to have 
access to health services to combat mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV. 
(b)  The programme to be realised progressively within available 
resources must include reasonable measures for counselling and 
testing pregnant women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant 
women on the options open to them to reduce the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV, and making appropriate treatment 
available to them . . . .53 
The Court went on to declare that the current policy fell short of 
compliance with this declaratory order and the government was ordered,  
“without delay to:  Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from 
being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and 
training sites.”54  Finally, the Court ruled:  “The orders made [above] do not 
preclude government from adapting its policy in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution if equally appropriate or better methods become available 
to it for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.”55 
The approach of the Court to social and economic rights, as the text of 
the Constitution requires and consistent with its approach to its relationship 
with the legislature and executive in other areas, is to consider whether the 
measures established by government in any respect of a particular right, or 
aspect of it, are reasonable.  In considering what will be reasonable, the 
Court said in an early case: 
 
 50. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (1) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
 51. Id. at 764–65 para. 135. 
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Reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of 
Rights as a whole.  The right of access to adequate housing is entrenched 
because we value human beings and want to ensure that they are afforded 
their basic human needs.  A society must seek to ensure that the basic 
necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on 
human dignity, freedom and equality.  To be reasonable, measures cannot 
leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they 
endeavour to realise.  Those whose needs are most urgent and whose 
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by 
the measures aimed at achieving the realisation of the right.56 
The protection of social and economic rights does not mean that every 
individual can come to court and demand a house.  The Constitution 
requires only that government take reasonable steps progressively and 
within available resources to afford citizens access to housing.  The court is 
thus serving as a public forum where government is called upon to explain 
its policies.  This form of justiciability is as much about facilitating 
participative and responsive democracy, as it is about social and economic 
rights. 
What is increasingly clear, however, is that the negative aspects of social 
and economic rights will provide real shields for citizens to protect them 
against the withdrawal of their access to health care, housing, and 
education.  So, in one case, for example, the court held that the rules for the 
sale in execution of houses needed to be reconceived to ensure that a court, 
in ordering execution against immovable property, would take into account 
the right of access to housing and not make an order which would result in a 
person being rendered homeless, which would be disproportionate.57  The 
Court reasoned that there would be circumstances in which it would be 
disproportionate or unjustifiable to permit execution against a home.  Such 
was the case before the court, in which one of the applicants had purchased 
vegetables in an amount of approximately R190 (less than £13) and, as a 
result of the failure to pay that debt and an absence of any movable property 
to satisfy the judgment, was at risk of her home being sold in execution of 
the debt.  The other applicant had borrowed R250 (less than £15) and faced 
the same result.  The Court stated: 
[I]t is clear that there will be circumstances in which it will be 
unjustifiable to allow execution . . . .  There will be many instances where 
execution will be unjustifiable because the advantage that attaches to a 
creditor who seeks execution will be far outweighed by the immense 
prejudice and hardship caused to the debtor.58 
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CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps surprising given our history that courts should have been 
given such an important role in our new constitutional democracy.  But I 
hope that I have illustrated tonight, neither tendentiously, nor in a manner 
insensitive to my own judicial role, that the role of courts under the South 
African Constitution is twofold.  The first is to protect the fundamental 
rights of South African citizens—not only civil and political rights, but also 
social and democratic rights.  The second is to foster a process of public 
reason in our democracy by allowing citizens, through the process of 
litigation, to ask government for their reasons for the exercise of public 
power, which reasons are then scrutinised by the courts with careful 
attention to the need to protect the legitimate constitutional role of the 
legislature and executive.  The important constitutional role entrusted to the 
courts should enhance the possibility of participatory and responsive 
government and also continue to facilitate the transformation of our broader 
society.  I would like to end, perhaps surprisingly, with the words of FDR in 
his famous four freedoms speech to which I have already referred and 
which I think sums up the ongoing challenge of change in the South African 
Constitution:  “Since the beginning of our . . . history,” he said, “we have 
been engaged in change—in a perpetual peaceful revolution—a revolution 
which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions—
without the concentration camp or the quicklime in the ditch.”59 
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